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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH-
WHEN FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE CLASSROOM CONFLICTS WITH THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (1 lth Cir.
1991).
During the academic years 1984 through 1987, Dr. Phillip A.
Bishop, an assistant professor of exercise physiology at the University
of Alabama, made occasional references to his own Christian religious
beliefs during classroom instructional time.' Dr. Bishop's comments
were made in the context of his understanding of the creative forces
behind human physiology, and his own philosophical approach to
teaching and the professional academic environment.' These remarks
were prefaced by his statements that such religious references were his
personal beliefs and should be taken to provide context to all he said
and did.'
During the spring of 1987, Dr. Bishop organized an optional class
where he lectured on "Evidences of God in Human Physiology." 4 These
discussions included the proposition that humankind is a product of
1. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1068 (lth Cir. 1991). Dr. Bishop was employed in the
Health, Physical Education, and Recreation Department in the College of Education. He taught
both graduate and undergraduate students, and he supervised research problems and theses. Id.
The University of Alabama is a state supported institution of higher education. Bishop's refer-
ences to his religious beliefs were occasional. Id.
2. Id. Bishop also made occasional religious references in response to students' questions on
coping with academic stress. He did not otherwise proselytize to his classes. He never read Bible
passages or engaged in prayer, nor did he hand out religious literature or hold special lectures on
religious topics during instructional time. Id.
3. Id. In stating his personal belief that "God came to earth in the form of Jesus Christ,"
Bishop told his class: "You need to recognize as my students that this is my bias and it colors
everything I say and do. If that is not your bias, that is fine." Affidavit of Phillip A. Bishop at 2,
Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1068.
4. 926 F.2d at 1068-69. This optional meeting was held after the prescribed instructional
time for Bishop's classes. Id.
UALR LAW .JOURNAL [Vol. 14:83
God, not of the evolutionary process.6 Although this optional class was
held just prior to the final examination, attendance was not mandatory
and had no effect on final grades." Five students and one professor at-
tended the optional class.
7
Some students in Dr. Bishop's 1986 and 1987 classes complained
to Carl Westerfield, Bishop's supervisor, about Bishop's remarks and
the optional class.' After consulting with both the dean of the college in
which Bishop taught and the university's counsel, Westerfield drafted a
memorandum to Bishop regarding "Religious Activities in a Public In-
stitution."9 After expressly affirming Dr. Bishop's academic and reli-
gious freedoms, 10 Westerfield's memorandum instructed Bishop to re-
frain from "the interjection of religious beliefs and/or preferences
during instructional time periods and . . . the optional classes where a
'Christian Perspective' of an academic topic is delivered."' 1 The univer-
sity, acting under advice from its counsel, believed that it had the right
to control its curriculum content and the duty to prevent an establish-
ment of religion.12 Dr. Bishop complied with the instructions contained
5. Id. at 1069.
6. Id. The defendants in the case argued that the timing of the optional class created the
possibility of the appearance of a coercive effect upon Bishop's students. Id. In determining indi-




10. Id. In the memorandum, Westerfield stated "[f]oremost, I want to reaffirm our commit-
ment to your right of academic freedom and freedom of religious belief. This communication
should not be construed as an attempt to interfere with or suppress your freedoms." Id. (quoting
Record at 15, Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1069).
11. Id. (quoting Record at 15, Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1069).
12. Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1564 (N.D. Ala. 1990). University counsel be-
lieved that Bishop's religious references during instructional periods constituted an establishment
of religion under the three-part test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). He
believed that Bishop's comments "lacked a secular purpose and had the effect of benefiting one
religious point of view." Id.
The Lemon test represents a recapitulation of the Supreme Court's framework for analysis in
determining whether a statute, ordinance, or official governmental action violates the Establish-
ment Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. In order to "pass" the Lemon
test, the statute or governmental action in question must 1) have a secular purpose; 2) have no
primary effect or principle which either advances or inhibits religion; and 3) not foster an "exces-
sive governmental entanglement with religion." 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
University counsel advised Dr. Bishop that the university, as owner of the teaching facilities,
had the right to determine curriculum content. Bishop, 732 F. Supp. at 1564.
The university believed the optional class held by Dr. Bishop to be violative of the Establish-
ment Clause because of its potential for a coercive effect upon the students, given its timing just
prior to the final examination and determination of final grades. 926 F.2d at 1069.
1991] RELIGIOUS SPEECH 85
in Westerfield's memorandum. 13
Following unsuccessful attempts to have the memorandum re-
scinded, Bishop filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
14
His complaint alleged violations of his free speech and free exercise
rights under the United States Constitution.1 He further claimed that
the memorandum was overbroad and void for vagueness.16 The univer-
sity's answer denied any First Amendment violations and raised the
Establishment Clause as an affirmative defense.
1 7
The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama con-
cluded that Westerfield's memorandum was vague and overbroad.' 8
The court further ruled that, because Dr. Bishop's actions did not vio-
late the Establishment Clause, 9 the university lacked a "sufficiently
compelling [interest] to support a content-based discrimination against
plaintiff's extracurricular on-campus discussions with students or his in-
class statements."20 Thus, the court held that the university violated
13. 926 F.2d at 1069.
14. Id. at 1069-70. Bishop tried to have the memorandum order rescinded during the fall of
1987 and again during the spring of 1988. He was unsuccessful on both occasions. 732 F. Supp. at
1564.
15. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1070. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
The Supreme Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to incorpo-
rate all of the First Amendment in order to extend its provisions to the states. Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free
exercise); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly and petition); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (speech and press). See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSliTUTIONAL
LAW 359-62 (3d ed. 1989). In this case there appeared to be no university policy proscribing
teachers' classroom speech involving personal views on subjects other than religion, nor was there
a prohibition against organized optional class meetings which were nonreligious in nature. 926
F.2d at 1069-70.
16. 926 F.2d at 1070.
17. Id. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
18. 732 F. Supp. at 1566. The district court found that Westerfield's restrictive memoran-
dum limited all expression of personal religious views. The university restriction on Bishop's class-
room speech "reach[ed] statements not violative of the Establishment Clause and fail[ed] to pro-
vide adequate notice of the proscribed speech." Id.
19. Id. at 1567. The district court applied the Lemon test. 403 U.S. at 612-13. See supra
note 12 and accompanying text. The court held that Bishop's conduct had a secular purpose, did
not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, and did not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. Id.
20. 732 F. Supp. at 1567. The court, relying on Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981),
applied a "strict scrutiny" standard of review. Id. at 1565. Under such a standard, for the univer-
sity to place a content-based restriction on Bishop's speech, it must first "'show that its regulation
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
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Dr. Bishop's free speech rights by its enforcement of the restrictive
memorandum.2
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed22 conclud-
ing that Dr. Bishop's classroom was not an open forum and therefore
the university's restriction of his speech need only meet a reasonably
related standard, rather than a strict scrutiny standard of review.23 The
court further concluded that the university's restrictions were reasona-
bly related to its legitimate authority to control the content of the
courses taught by Dr. Bishop.24 The court also held that the memoran-
dum did not violate the free exercise rights of Dr. Bishop.28 Addition-
ally, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether Dr. Bishop's con-
duct was a violation of the Establishment Clause, 26 although it did find
that the university's proscription of Dr. Bishop's religious interjections
into his curriculum did not, in itself, amount to an establishment of
religion. 27 Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
The First Amendment prohibits the government from enacting re-
strictions upon citizens' rights to free speech and free exercise of reli-
gion.2 It further prohibits the government from establishing a reli-
gion.29 The First Amendment rights of public school teachers, even as
state employees, are no exception to these general constitutional rules.30
Similarly, states may not enforce policies and practices which amount
to an establishment of religion in public schools.31
end.'" Id. at 1566 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981)).
21. Bishop, 732 F. Supp. at 1568.
22. 926 F.2d at 1068.
23. Id. at 1071. The circuit court found that the university classroom was not a public
forum, and therefore, did not merit a "strict scrutiny" standard of review for content-based re-
strictions on speech. Id. See infra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
24. 926 F.2d at 1074-77.
25. Id. at 1077.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1077-78. The court applied the Lemon test. 403 U.S. at 612-13. See supra note
12 and accompanying text. The court held that the university's restriction on Bishop's religious
speech did not amount to an establishment by excluding only Christian viewpoints. Id.
28. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. See supra note 15.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See supra note 15. This prohibition also applies to actions taken
by state government officials. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1940).
30. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(teachers' First Amendment rights do not disappear once they enter the campus); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (teachers' rights to publicly criticize school board on matters
of public importance); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (teachers' associational rights).
31. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (state may not require the teach-
ing of "creation science" in its curriculum); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam)
(public schools may not post copies of the Ten Commandments on the walls of classrooms); Ep-
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The unique setting, structure, and role of public schools can create
an inherent tension of constitutional proportions. 2 Educators have the
latitude to determine curriculum requirements and content, 33 to control
conduct, 4 and to instill values.3 5 On the other hand, students and
teachers have constitutional rights which cannot be limited by school
officials. 36 Balancing these competing interests has been a frequent task
of both the Supreme Court and the lower courts.3"
Despite volumes of litigation in this general area, the Supreme
Court has yet to squarely address the extent to which a public school
teacher's right to freedom of expression in the classroom supersedes the
right of school officials to determine course and curriculum content.3 8
In the absence of any such precedent, some federal courts have analo-
gized teachers' classroom speech39 rights to Supreme Court decisions
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (state may not prohibit the teaching of the theory of
evolution when such prohibition is based on religious grounds); School Dist. of Abington Township
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (public schools may not require Bible readings or prayers).
32. Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1647-51 (1986). See Hazelwood
School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
33. E.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107.
34. E.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
35. E.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d
566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
36. E.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, noted:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for al-
most 50 years.
Id.
Some twenty-six years earlier, Justice Jackson was equally eloquent in describing why First
Amendment values should be carefully guarded in the public school setting:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.
These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none
that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educat-
ing the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional free-
doms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
37. See Levin, supra note 32, at 1649-50 n.10. For a thorough discussion of the case law
exploring these competing interests, as well as a suggested balancing approach, see Gregory A.
Clarick, Note, Public School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting the Right to Teach,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV., 693, 693-713 (1990).
38. Levin, supra note 32, at 1664. Accord Clarick, Note, supra note 37, at 696.
39. In this context, a teacher's "classroom" or "in-class" speech refers to his or her methods
and practices in teaching or assisting students with their course work.
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regarding teachers' articulated rights outside the classroom as citizens
and government employees. "° Other federal courts have analogized
teachers' classroom rights to the Supreme Court's declarations of the
in-class rights of students.4"
The leading case concerning teachers' articulated rights outside
the classroom"2 is Pickering v. Board of Education.43 In this decision,
Justice Marshall outlined a balancing approach to resolve the conflict
between the state's interest as an employer in regulating its employees'
speech and the teacher's interest in protected public expression." The
Court concluded that when a teacher speaks out publicly against his or
her employer on a matter of public concern, such speech may be re-
stricted or punished by the school only when it would impair the
school's ability to operate efficiently, or when it would impede the
proper performance of the teachers' daily duties.4
5
Teachers also have protected rights of association even when such
associations are contrary to the requirements of state law or the prefer-
ences of local school boards. 46 In Shelton v. Tucker' 7 the Court struck
40. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Pred v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Clarick, Note, supra note 37, at 699-
704.
41. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980);
James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972). See also
Clarick, Note, supra note 37, at 704-08.
42. See Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teach-
ers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1303-04 (1976).
43. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering a teacher was dismissed by his school board for
writing a letter to the editor of the local newspaper. His letter was critical of school officials'
handling of previously proposed school revenue elections. It appeared in the paper during the
campaign for a new school tax. In his letter, the teacher also attacked the school board's funding
allocation between the school's athletic department and its academic programs. Id. at 564-67.
44. Id. at 568-73. The Court stated that teachers were not required to relinquish their First
Amendment rights as citizens simply by virtue of their status as public employees. Id. at 568.
45. Id. at 572-73. The Court further held that a school could restrict or punish a teacher's
public, critical comments on matters of public concern if school officials could show the state-
ment(s) to have been made recklessly or with knowledge of its falsity. Id. at 573-74. See New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (for a public official to recover for allegedly defama-
tory statements relating to his official conduct, "actual malice" must be shown).
46. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952) (loyalty oath prohibited). In Shelton a teacher's contract was not renewed because he
failed to file an affidavit in compliance with Arkansas law which required disclosure of all organi-
zations to which he belonged and had belonged for the previous five years. He was a member of
the NAACP. In overturning the statute, Justice Stewart noted that "to compel a teacher to dis-
close his every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right to free association, a right closely
allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free
society." 364 U.S. at 485-86 (citations omitted).
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a balance between the state's interest and the rights of its teachers as
citizens, holding that the state's right to determine the competence and
fitness of its teachers did not outweigh teachers' rights of freedom of
association.4 a
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents49 the Court found that a New
York statute which required teachers to certify that they were not
Communists ° was unconstitutional."' Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan quoted Shelton extensively and noted the nation's commit-
ment to preserving "academic freedom. 652 The Court underscored the
value of First Amendment freedoms on campus by stating that "[t]he
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' ""
47. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
48. 364 U.S. at 490.
49. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
50. Id. at 592. The State University of New York teachers who were involved refused to
sign certificates which stated that they were not members of the Communist Party and that, if
they ever had been Communists, they had communicated that fact to the university president.
51. Id. at 604, 609-10.
52. Id. at 603. Keyishian was a 5-to-4 decision. Justice Clark wrote the dissenting opinion
in which Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White joined. Id. at 620.
Justice Brennan noted at one point that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms
is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." Id. at 603 (quoting Shelton,
364 U.S. at 487). But see Goldstein, supra note 42, at 1335-47.
In his article, Professor Goldstein concludes that no independent constitutional right to aca-
demic freedom exists, despite the pronouncements in Keyishian. He further concludes that neither
the professionalism, nor freedom of expression, nor the "marketplace of ideas" constructs of edu-
cation provide an adequate base for a teacher's constitutional right to teach contrary to the prefer-
ences of his or her superiors. Goldstein, supra note 42, at 1335-57.
The basis for the doctrine of "academic freedom" is found in the nineteenth century German
concept of the university: lehrfreiheit and lernfreiheit, or freedom of teaching and learning. Gold-
stein, supra note 42, at 1299. See generally Stephen A. Goldstein, Academic Freedom: Its Mean-
ing and Underlying Premises As Seen Through the American Experience, 11 IsR. L. REV. 52
(1976). For a differing opinion as to the degree of constitutional protection which should be af-
forded "academic freedom," see William Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers
and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841, 869-70.
53. 385 U.S. at 603 (citation omitted). "The essentiality of freedom in the community of
American universities is almost self-evident." Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion)). See also Goldstein, supra note 42, at 1297, 1350-55.
Professor Goldstein asserts that there are two models of American public education: a mar-
ketplace of ideas model and a value inculcation model. The marketplace of ideas model is more
closely aligned with the German notion of freedom of teaching and learning. It is analytic in
nature in that both student and teacher are active participants in the search for truth. New wis-
dom is sought. This pedagogical model more closely fits our theoretical paradigm of college and
postgraduate studies. Goldstein, supra note 42, at 1297, 1350-55.
In contrast, the value inculcation model is prescriptive by design. It proceeds on the notion
that the teacher's role is to pass along accepted truths and information to absorbent, theoretically
passive students. New wisdom is not sought. This pedagogical approach is the accepted view
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One year after the Keyishian decision the Court faced the under-
lying issue of academic freedom 54 in Epperson v. Arkansas.5  While
twice citing to Keyishian" and commenting on "arbitrary" restrictions
upon the freedom of teachers to teach and students to learn,5" the
Court did not apply a balancing approach as it did in Pickering.8 In-
stead, the Court decided the case on the basis of the Establishment
Clause.5 9 On varying grounds and to varying degrees, some lower fed-
among both educators and the courts when analyzing the mission of primary, intermediate, and
secondary education. Id.
Despite its apparent application to the marketplace of ideas or analytic model, "academic
freedom," as an individual teacher's right superseding the authority of states to determine curricu-
lum and content, is not mandated by either the model's theoretical basis or the Constitution. Id. at
1350-55.
It is the inherent philosophical contrast between the value inculcation or prescriptive model
and the marketplace of ideas or analytic model which provides the basis for much of the constitu-
tional litigation arising out of students' and teachers' asserted First Amendment rights in the
classroom. These divergent approaches to educational theory also help explain the lack of clear
direction from the Court in defining a precise and consistent balance between educators' interests
and teachers' pedagogical choices in class. See generally Mark G. Yudof, When Governments
Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV.
863 (1979); Goldstein, supra note 42; Goldstein, supra note 52.
54. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
55. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Susan Epperson, a biology teacher in the Little Rock School Dis-
trict, was faced with the dilemma of violating a state criminal statute by teaching materials deal-
ing with the theory of evolution as contained in her prescribed textbook. Her alternative was to
ignore the material in the prescribed text, thereby obeying the Arkansas statute but necessarily
disobeying the teaching instructions given her in the prescribed materials. She sought a declara-
tion that the state statute was void. She also sought to enjoin the school district from dismissing
her for violation of the statute by the teaching of her prescribed text. She was uncertain whether
the statute proscribed her from "teaching" the material, "explaining" the theory of evolution, or
merely "mentioning" it. The Arkansas statute, which criminalized the teaching of the theory of
evolution, was an adaptation of a Tennessee law from which arose the famous Scopes trial of
1927. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98-103. See Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn.
1927).
56. The Court stated that "tilt is much too late to argue that the state may impose upon
the teachers in its schools any conditions that it chooses, however, restrictive they may be to
constitutional guarantees." 393 U.S. at 107 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06). "[T]he First
Amendment 'does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.''" 393 U.S. at
105 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
57. 393 U.S. at 105 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
58. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
59. 393 U.S. at 104-09. Citing the "test" of Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963), the Court found that the Arkansas statute had the primary purpose of advancing
religion. Id. See Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
In a dissenting opinion in Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S.
271 (1984), Justice Brennan suggests that Epperson was decided on grounds of academic freedom
rather than on grounds of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 296-97.
In a concurring opinion in Epperson, Justice Black vigorously questioned the notion that
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eral courts have recognized a teacher's limited discretion to select
course content and methodology. 60 This discretion has been traced to
the First Amendment. 61
In searching for guidance, some lower courts have analogized
teachers' in-class free speech rights to those announced by the Supreme
Court in cases concerning students' expressive rights on campus. 62 In
such cases, the competing interests are similar to those weighed in
Pickering.63 A landmark case for students' First Amendment rights in
school was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict.64 The Court found itself faced with school officials' desire to "pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools" 6 5 as contrasted to students'
interests in a protected right of freedom of expression. 6 The Court
held that school officials could only restrict student expression which
would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." 6 Moreover, such
restrictions must be grounded in something more than the officials' neb-
"academic freedom" provides a teacher the protected right to teach contrary to the directions of
his or her superiors. 393 U.S. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring).
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stewart implied that, while school officials should
prescribe the subjects to be included in the public school curriculum, teachers should have some
leeway in their pedagogical approach. Id. at 115-16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
60. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F.
Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971), affd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Parducci v.
Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970); but cf. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp.,
631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (relevance of "academic freedom" is limited at secondary school
level). See also Levin, supra note 32, at 1665-66.
61. Levin, supra note 32, at 1665-66.
62. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305-07 (7th Cir.
1980) (discussing in dicta that the First Amendment protects a teacher's general discussion and
comments in the classroom); Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 633-34 (2d Cir.
1972) (teachers have protected right of expression); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 571-
75 (2d Cir. 1972) (teacher's right to wear black armband to protest Vietnam war is protected by
the First Amendment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
63. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
64. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker a group of students decided to express their objections
to the Vietnam war and their support for a truce. They chose to manifest this expression by
wearing black armbands to school on a certain day and for a period of time thereafter. The
principals of the school district learned of the plan and promulgated a rule banning such a display.
Students found wearing the armbands would be asked to remove them. Those who failed to com-
ply would be suspended until they returned without the armbands. Though the students knew of
the new regulation, they chose to carry out their display. Some of these students were subse-
quently suspended and they filed suit against the school, alleging a violation of their First Amend-
ment rights. Id. at 504-05.
65. Id. at 507.
66. Id. at 506-07.
67. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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ulous fear that a disturbance might occur.6 a Thus, the Court held that
school officials had engaged in constitutionally impermissible content-
based discrimination."9
Nineteen years after the decision in Tinker, the Court re-ex-
amined student expressive activities on campus in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier. ° In Kuhlmeier the Court substantially increased
school officials' authority to restrict student speech.71 The Kuhlmeier
decision distinguished Tinker on two grounds. First, utilizing a forum
analysis, the Court decided that the student speech took place in a non-
public forum and any restrictions on such speech were subject to a
more deferential level of review.7 2 Second, the Court framed the issue
not as whether a school must tolerate certain student speech, but
whether a school must promote certain student speech.
73
The balance between the competing interests of school officials and
students in Kuhlmeier weighed more heavily in favor of the school's
concern for its "basic educational mission. '74 Justice White defined this
68. 393 U.S. at 508. Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, said:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.
Id. at 509.
69. Id. at 511. "In our system, state operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarian-
ism. . . . [Students] may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved." Id.
Some commentators have interpreted Tinker to support the proposition of the classroom as an
educational public forum in which the "marketplace of ideas" or analytic model approach to edu-
cation relegates school officials' regulatory authority over student speech toone of impartial time,
place, and manner control. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an
Educational Public Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 278, 294 (1970); Goldstein, supra note 42,
at 1351-55; supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
70. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). High school student journalists produced two articles, one dealing
with teenage pregnancy, the other dealing with the impact of divorce on students. Both were
disallowed for publication in the school's newspaper by the principal. Id. at 262-64.
71. Id. at 270. "[S]chool officials were entitled to regulate the contents of Spectrum in any
reasonable manner." Id. See Clarick, Note, supra note 37, at 708-09.
72. 484 U.S. at 267-70. "If the facilities have instead been reserved for other intended pur-
poses, 'communicative or otherwise,' then no public forum has been created .... " Id. at 267
(quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). See infra
notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
73. 484 U.S. at 270-71. The issue in Tinker, the Court said, was whether a school should be
required to tolerate certain student speech. Id. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
The principal stated his reasons for disallowing publication of the two stories. He feared that the
article on teenage pregnancy might betray the identity of the pregnant students interviewed and
that the references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for the younger stu-
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standard by stating that "educators do not offend the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."'7 5 However,
the Court expressly declined to decide whether the "same degree of
deference" would apply to school-sponsored student expressive activi-
ties which occurred on the college or university level. 76
In Kuhlmeier the Court began its analysis by determining the na-
ture of the "forum" at issue in a school-sponsored student newspaper.77
The standard of review, and thereby the extent to which government
may restrict speech on public property, is now routinely determined by
the Court applying a forum analysis as a precursor to a balancing of
interests under a traditional First Amendment analytical framework.78
The three types of forums are set forth at length by the Court in Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association.79
The first type identified is the traditional public forum.80 The
traditional public forum provides the greatest level of protection to ex-
pression and consists of public property historically used for speech and
assembly.81 In this forum, the government may not engage in content-
based speech restrictions or exclusions unless such regulation is "neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve
that end." '82 In a traditional public forum the government may impose
dents. He felt that the second article, concerning divorce, should not be published unless the per-
son criticized in it had the opportunity to defend himself. 484 U.S. at 263-64.
75. 484 U.S. at 273. The opinion was a 5-to-3 decision. Writing for the majority, Justice
White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice
Brennan filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Id. at 261.
76. Id. at 273-74 n.7.
77. Id. at 267.
78. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1219-25
(1984).
79. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). Perry was a 5-to-4 decision.
80. Id. at 45.
81. Id. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor wrote:
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to as-
sembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply cir-
cumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks which "have immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions."
Id. (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
82. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1960)). This standard of review is most
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content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions which are nar-
rowly drawn to serve a significant governmental interest but which also
leave ample alternative channels of communication.
8 3
The second forum identified by Perry is the limited public forum. "'
It is one "designated" by the state for public use as a place for expres-
sion.83 Once a forum is so designated, the government may act to re-
strict expression only under the strict confines which serve to protect
speech in the traditional public forum." The designated public forum
can be limited to only certain groups, topics, or both.8 7 Those within
the included groups or topics may be restricted only under a "strict
scrutiny" analysis.88 Those outside the included groups or topics may
be restricted under the more deferential standard applied to nonpublic
forums.8 9
The final type of forum is the nonpublic forum. 90 This public prop-
erty may be reserved by the state for certain intended purposes. 91 The
regulation of speech in this forum need only be reasonable, but it can-
not be an effort to suppress expression based on an individual's
often referred to as "strict scrutiny." See JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, & J. NELSON
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 530-31, 783-84 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK].
83. 460 U.S. at 45. See generally NOWAK, supra note 82, at 970-84.
84. 460 U.S. at 45. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university meeting
facilities); City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meeting); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546 (1975) (municipal theater).
85. 460 U.S. at 45. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 802-03 (1985).
86. 460 U.S. at 46 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70).
87. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
88. Id. at 806.
89. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267-70 (1988); Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 802-11. Some commentators have argued that Cornelius effectively eliminates the concept
of a designated public forum as an area where significant protections for speech exist. See Douglas
Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Pri-
vate Speakers, 81 Nw. UL. REV. 1, 47 (1986). See also E. Gregory Wallace, Comment, Beyond
Neutrality: Equal Access and the Meaning of Religious Freedom, 12 U. ARK. LIrrLE ROCK L.J.
335, 360 (1989-90). A dissent in Cornelius agrees:
The Court's analysis transforms the First Amendment into a mere ban on view-
point censorship, ignores the principles underlying the public forum doctrine, flies in the
face of the decisions in which this Court has identified property as a limited public
forum, and empties the limited-public-forum concept of all its meaning.
473 U.S. at 815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. These forums are nonpublic either by tradition or design. Id.
91. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (charity drive for public employees); Perry,
460 U.S. 37 (1983) (school mail facilities).
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viewpoint.92
The Court in Perry found a school's mail facilities to be a nonpub-
lic forum even though the facilities were open for use by certain
teacher and student groups.93 In such a forum, school officials could
restrict or exclude speech if the restrictions were reasonable in light of
the purpose of the forum.94 By contrast, the Court in Widmar v. Vin-
cent98 found that, by opening its facilities to certain student groups, the
university had created a designated public forum and could only ex-
clude or restrict speech under a strict scrutiny standard of review. 91
Thus, in Widmar and Perry the Court apparently had two designated
public forums; one was held as such while the other was found to be a
nonpublic forum.97
Applying a strict scrutiny standard in Widmar, the Court searched
the university's restriction for the requisite narrow tailoring to achieve
a compelling state interest.9 8 This proposition is opposite that of
Kuhimeier where the standard of review was deferential and weighed
more favorably toward justifying the state's interests. 99 In Widmar the
Court suggested that avoidance of an establishment of religion by a
public university may be characterized as a compelling state interest if
the avoided conduct would amount to an establishment under the
three-pronged "test" of Lemon v. Kurtzman."' The Widmar opinion
92. 460 U.S. at 46 (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 483 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
Nonpublic forums are those in which accommodation for expressive activities would be incon-
sistent with the primary function of the property. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
(military reservations); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jailhouses).
93. 460 U.S. at 46-49.
94. Id. at 50-54. Such restrictions, however, must still remain viewpoint neutral. Id. at 46.
See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
95. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). A registered student religious group which had previously re-
ceived permission to meet in university facilities was prohibited from any further such meetings
because of a university regulation which proscribed the use of its buildings or grounds for religious
purposes. Id. at 265-67.
96. Id. at 267. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
97. Compare Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-70 (restriction in forum open for use by student
groups created a public forum) with Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-49 (school mail facilities open to
certain groups was a nonpublic forum).
98. 454 U.S. at 270.
99. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
100. 454 U.S. at 270-71. See Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
For an interesting evolution of the second prong of the Lemon test under the reasoning of
Justice O'Connor, see Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623-37 (1989) (O'Connor con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor argues that
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found that a carefully designed university equal access policy would not
be incompatible with the elements of Lemon.1" The Court explicitly
declined, however, to decide the issues which would arise if a state fa-
cilitation of free exercise and free speech should directly confront the
prohibitions of the Establishment Clause.102
The analysis becomes extremely complex when the free speech in-
terest is that of religious speech.01 The equal access cases have demon-
strated this complexity.104 If students and teachers have a protected
right of freedom of religious speech and the state's compelling interest
is avoiding an establishment of religion, the resulting constitutional
conflict is of paramount significance.10 5 Is the Establishment Clause to
be placed in a position of permanent supremacy over the Free Speech
Clause? Should free speech rights always take precedence? Should
these determinations be made on a case-by-case basis with a careful
weighing of the competing interests under the facts and circumstances
of each case?10 6 As recently as 1990, the Court has declined to resolve
an endorsement test, rather than a coercion analysis, better achieves the real purpose of the sec-
ond prong of Lemon and the true meaning of the Establishment Clause. Id.
Justice O'Connor continued this preference for an endorsement test in Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-73 (1990) (plurality opinion). The judgment in Mergens upheld
the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (Supp. 1989). In her plurality
opinion regarding her predilection for an endorsement test to determine an establishment, Justice
O'Connor notes "there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion,
which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." 110 S. Ct. at 2372 (emphasis in original).
101. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-76. The ultimate analysis inWidmar did not attempt to rec-
oncile the competing free speech and establishment issues. See infra note 102 and accompanying
text.
102. 454 U.S. at 273 n.13.
103. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-75 and nn. 12-13.
104. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984)
(school's duty to prevent an establishment of religion outweighs students' free speech rights); Lub-
bock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983) (elementary school violates Establishment Clause by allowing vol-
untary student religious meetings either before or after class hours); Brandon v. Board of Educ.,
635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981) (before class voluntary student
prayer meetings on high school campus are prohibited by the Establishment Clause). See also
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of Equal
Access Act but expressly declining to reconcile the competing First Amendment issues of speech
and establishment). See generally Laycock, supra note 89; Wallace, Comment, supra note 89.
105. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 557. "We are faced with a constitutional conflict of the
highest order." Id. See also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 (state interest in avoiding establishment on
campus may be a compelling interest under strict scrutiny free speech analysis) (emphasis added).
See generally supra note 12 and accompanying text.
106. Bender, 741 F.2d at 557.
1991] RELIGIOUS SPEECH 97
these issues.""7
Bishop v. Aronov'08 presented this First Amendment conflict. Dr.
Bishop sought protection from university limitations on his classroom
religious speech rights. The university restricted Bishop's religious
speech in an effort to fulfill its duty to avoid an establishment of reli-
gion.' 0 9 The Eleventh Circuit first determined that Bishop's classroom
was not an open public forum. 10 The court relied on the reasoning in
Kuhlmeier to conclude that the university had not opened its facilities
for general use by the public or some. segment thereof."' Rather, the
university reserved its classrooms for other intended purposes, such as
the teaching of university courses for credit." 2 Therefore, university of-
ficials were free to impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of all
members of the school community."' Thus, the relevant issue for the
court was whether the university's restriction of Dr. Bishop's speech
was reasonable."
4
The court next considered Bishop's facial challenge of the univer-
sity memorandum on grounds that its restriction was overbroad and
void for vagueness." 5 The court determined that the memorandum
reached only those remarks of Dr. Bishop made in a curriculum-related
context, both in the scheduled class and in the optional class." 6 Citing
its duty to narrowly construe the challenged restrictions," 7 the court
determined that the memorandum's restrictions were "sufficiently nar-
107. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370 (1990). See supra note 104.
Mergens upheld the Equal Access Act under a challenge to its constitutionality on Establishment
Clause grounds. 110 S. Ct. at 2373. Because the case was decided on statutory grounds, the Court
refused to reconcile the competing First Amendment issues. Id. at 2370.
108. 926 F.2d 1066 (1 1th Cir. 1991). Judge Gibson, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation, wrote for the court. Id. at 1067.
109. Id. at 1069.
110. Id. at 1071. The court specifically reversed the district court's finding that the univer-
sity had created an open public forum where content-based speech restrictions must meet a "strict
scrutiny" analysis in order to survive. Bishop, 732 F. Supp. at 1566 (citing Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981)).
111. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071.
112. Id.
113. Id. Contra Bishop, 732 F. Supp. at 1567.
114. 926 F.2d at 1071.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11 th Cir. 1990)). "It
has long been a tenet of First Amendment law that in determining a facial challenge to a statute
[here the memo], if it be 'readily susceptible' to a narrowing construction that would make it
constitutional, it will be upheld." Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071 (quoting Virginia v. American Book-
sellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)).
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row and clear to put Dr. Bishop on notice" of what was permissible and
impermissible conduct."' The court concluded that the restrictions did
not reach protected speech and the memorandum was neither over-
broad nor vague.""
Although freedom of religion and the Establishment Clause were
at issue, the analysis undertaken by the court involved an application of
the framework developed to ascertain the free speech rights of public
school teachers and students.120 The court's analysis focused on the
right of the university to control its curriculum content' by the use of
reasonable restrictions over Bishop's in-class speech. 2 2 The dispositive
consideration, therefore, was the reasonableness of the restrictions as
determined by a balancing of the university's concern for its "basic
educational mission" ' s against Dr. Bishop's interest in academic free-
dom and his articulated free speech rights.
24
The court then analogized the Kuhimeier reasoning to the facts in
this case in order to evaluate the sufficiency of the university's interests
in placing restrictions on Bishop's in-class speech. 2 5 First, the univer-
sity had an obvious interest in preventing the inherent coercive effect
that a professor's speech may have upon students. 12 6 Second, as a pub-
lic employer, the university had an interest in reasonably restricting the
118. 926 F.2d at 1071.
119. Id. at 1071-72.
120. Id. See. e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (student
speech in curriculum-related expressive activities may be restricted by school officials if the re-
strictions are reasonable); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S 503
(1969) (students have a protected right to nondisruptive freedom of expression in the classroom);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (teachers have a protected right to speak
outside the classroom on issues of public importance).
121. 926 F.2d at 1076-77.
122. Id. at 1074. Because the court earlier determined the university's classroom to be a
nonpublic forum, the university was allowed to impose reasonable content-based restrictions on the
in-class speech of Dr. Bishop, restrictions it could not otherwise impose on his public speech
outside the classroom. Id. at 1071, 1074. See Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. at 266-67. See also supra notes
77-92 and accompanying text.
123. 926 F.2d at 1074 (quoting Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266). In Kuhimeier, Justice White,
writing for the Court, stated that "[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent
with its 'basic educational mission.'" 484 U.S. at 266-67.
124. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076. See supra notes 36-61 and accompanying text.
125. 926 F.2d at 1074. Kuhimeier dealt with the free expression rights of students at the
high school level. 484 U.S. at 262. However, the Bishop court reasoned that the narrow issue
present in this case, "the extent to which an institution may limit in-school expressions which
suggest the school's approval," allowed the use of the Kuhlmeier reasoning by analogy even at the
university level. 926 F.2d at 1074.
126. 926 F.2d at 1074. "The University's interest is most obvious when student complaints
suggest apparent coercion--even when not intended by the professor." Id.
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speech of its employees.127 As an institution of higher education it had
an interest in determining the curricular content and the classroom
speech of its teachers. 12 8 Balanced against these interests was the as-
serted academic freedom, as a derivative of freedom of speech, of Dr.
Bishop." 9 The court distinguished the Keyishian pronouncement of
"academic freedom" from the facts at hand, however, and found no
further support for an otherwise independent First Amendment right to
academic freedom. 30
Balancing these interests, the court held that the university's con-
cern about the curriculum content of its classes and the in-class con-
duct of its professors was sufficient to allow its reasonable restriction of
Dr. Bishop's classroom speech.' 3' The restrictions adopted were reason-
able because they only proscribed Dr. Bishop's in-class religious refer-
ences made in connection with the content of the prescribed course
materials.'
The court further held that the university had valid interests in
preventing the appearance of coercion and in controlling the content of
curriculum-related optional classes. Such interests were sufficient to
permit the prohibition on optional classes discussing a "Christian per-
spective" of an academic topic.' These restrictions were reasonable
because they did not prevent similar meetings which were clearly sepa-
rate and distinct from the curricular course requirements.13
127. Id. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 ("it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees"); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485
(1960) ("[tlhere can be no doubt of the right of a state to investigate the competence and fitness
of those whom it hires to teach in its schools"). See generally Goldstein, supra note 42, at 1337.
128. 926 F.2d at 1074.
129. Id. at 1075. The court quoted Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), in
which Justice Brennan stated:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom
is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.
Id. at 603.
130. 926 F.2d at 1075. Keyishian dealt with the refusal of public school teachers to sign
certificates stating that they were not Communists. 385 U.S. at 592. See supra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text. Judge Gibson refused to extrapolate a right of academic freedom in the Keyi-
shian context to the Bishop context and said that he would not use such an analogy to forbid
schools from exercising control over their own courses. 926 F.2d at 1075. See also Goldstein,
supra note 42, at 1298.
131. 926 F.2d at 1076.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Concluding his reasoning on the free speech issues of the case, Judge Gibson wrote:
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Dr. Bishop also challenged the university's actions as a violation of
his right to free exercise of religion. 13 5 The court found little merit to
this claim and held that the university's restriction was directed at
Bishop's teaching practices, not. his efforts to practice his religion. 136
Thus, the court found no free exercise violation.137
The court's final consideration addressed Establishment Clause is-
sues.138 The university raised the Establishment Clause 3 9 as an affirm-
ative defense to Dr. Bishop's complaint. 1 0 Bishop argued that the uni-
versity's actions amounted to an establishment of religion because the
only viewpoints proscribed were Christian viewpoints.14' Although not-
ing that the university should have a concern at the mere appearance of
proselytizing by a faculty member,142 the court did not reach the ques-
tion of whether Bishop's actions constituted an establishment of reli-
gion. "143 Also, the court held that the university's actions were not an
establishment of religion under the Lemon test."4 Rather than creating
In short, Dr. Bishop and the University disagree about a matter of content in the
courses he teaches. The University must have the final say in such a dispute. . . .We
have simply concluded that the University as an employer and educator can direct Dr.
Bishop to refrain from expression of religious viewpoints in the classroom and like
settings.
Id. at 1076-77.
135. Id. at 1070. Bishop's free exercise challenge came in his amended complaint.
136. Id. at 1077.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. U.S. CO NST. amend. I. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
140. 926 F.2d at 1070.
141. Id. at 1077. Bishop argued that because the university's restrictions excluded only the
Christian viewpoint from being discussed in his classroom, the university's actions constituted an
establishment of religious viewpoints other than Christianity. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. In dicta, Judge Gibson noted the "particularly suspect" nature of Bishop's optional
class in light of the creation/design content of his lecture. Id. (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578 (1987) (Louisiana statute requiring the teaching of "creation science" whenever the
theory of evolution is taught is a violation of the Establishment Clause because it lacks a secular
purpose and it impermissibly endorses religion)). The court in Bishop chose, however, to dispose of
the case on grounds of permissible reasonable restrictions on speech, rather than on Establishment
Clause grounds. Id. "[W]e hold that [the] memo was reasonable and within [the university's)
powers to control the content of curriculum in the classroom, regardless of the Establishment
Clause." Id. at 1078.
144. Id. at 1077. The court found that the university's actions 1) had only a secular pur-
pose; 2) neither advanced nor inhibited religion because the university sought to "maintain a neu-
tral, secular classroom by its restrictions"; and 3) did not promote an excessive entanglement of
government with religion because the university sought "only to extricate itself from any religious
influence or instruction in its secular courses." Id. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611-12
(1971). See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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an establishment of religion, the university's actions sought to avoid
any entanglements with religion .145 Furthermore, the memorandum ex-
cluded only Christian viewpoints because only those specific viewpoints
were a source of student complaint and subsequent dispute between the
university and Dr. Bishop.
14 6
The court's analysis of the facts and issues in Bishop is troubling
in a number of respects.1 4 7 The first-troubling element is the court's
manipulation of the forum analysis. Initially, the court found that Dr.
Bishop's classroom was not an open forum.1 48 The court expended little
discussion in deciding this critical issue. However, the short analysis
undertaken virtually decided the case.
The restriction placed by the university upon Dr. Bishop's speech
was a content-based prohibition. For content-based restrictions to pass
constitutional muster, they must normally survive "strict scrutiny" un-
less a more deferential standard of review can be justified. 4 9 Thus, in
recent years the Supreme Court has utilized a forum analysis to locate
the relevant starting point for First Amendment free speech protec-
tion.1 50 For the Bishop court that starting point was a reliance on the
Kuhlmeier decision.
15 1
In Kuhlmeier the Court dealt with a school-sponsored newspaper
written and published by high school students under the direction and
guidance of a teacher/advisor. 15 1 At issue was the propriety of student-
written materials for publication in an instructional tool.,05 In Bishop
the setting was a university classroom in which at least some of the
145. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1078.
146. Id. at 1077-78.
147. 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1990).
148. Id. at 1071. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
149. The restriction must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text. This analysis applies
only to protected speech. Some forms of speech are not protected. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 447 (1980) (misleading commercial speech);
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (incitement to imminent lawlessness); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
150. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 78, at 1221-22 n.15 (finding that the Court has used
the phrase "public forum" only thirty-two times, thirty of which have been since 1970 and thir-
teen of which occurred between 1980 and 1984 (the date of the article's publication)).
151. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1070-71.
152. 484 U.S. at 262-64. The Kuhlmeier court expressly declined to extend its reasoning to
the college or university level. Id. at 273-74 n.7.
153. Id. at 262-64.
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participants were graduate students. At issue were the "pure speech"' 154
comments and the pedagogical approach of an accomplished professor.
Despite the almost irreconcilable factual differences between
Bishop and Kuhimeier, the court in Bishop appeared predisposed to an
application of the deferential Kuhlmeier balancing approach. 1 a In or-
der to adopt such an approach, it had to first find justification for giv-
ing greater latitude to university officials. In order to achieve that re-
sult, the court turned to the forum doctrine.
Such an approach points out an inherent problem frequently en-
countered in the application of the forum doctrine: the outcome deter-
minative nature of the forum selection. In many cases the forum analy-
sis itself, rather than the true balancing of the real interests at stake,' 56
becomes the focal point of First Amendment case opinions."" By
manipulating the myriad twists and turns of the forum doctrine, courts
are able to engage in linedrawing semantics which allow constructs
designed to achieve a desired result. Thus, the selection of a particular
forum label, rather than a direct assessment of competing First
Amendment issues, is often dispositive of the case.
In Bishop a better argument can be made that the university
classroom was a limited public forum as long as faculty were not pro-
hibited from expressing their personal views in classroom discussions. 1 8
In the university setting, the freedom to teach, to learn, and to ex-
change ideas is the very essence of higher education."" In a limited
public forum, Dr. Bishop's classroom comments would receive the high-
est level of constitutional protection. Yet, in its apparent desire to give
university officials greater control over all classroom speech by faculty
154. See supra note 1-3 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
156. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 78. The Farber & Nowak article provides a very
good criticism of the use of the public forum doctrine in general. It also proposes a "focused
balancing test" as an alternative in certain contexts. This test would more accurately attempt to
take into account the real competing interests present in free speech cases. Id.
157. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
158. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1069.
159. If a university is a "marketplace of ideas" then its classrooms might appropriately be
characterized as academic open fora. See Nahmod, supra note 69, at 294. While Professor Gold-
stein declines to find a constitutional mandate for absolute teacher academic freedom in the class-
room, he does concede that the analytic pedagogical model of freedom of teaching and learning is
most at home on a university campus. Goldstein, supra note 42, at 1342. See also supra notes 52-
53 and accompanying text.
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members, 160 the court placed Bishop's classroom in the same category
with a high school newspaper. This accomplished what Kuhlmeier de-
clined to do."' The Bishop court equated abstract university classroom
discussion with school-sponsored expressive activities on the secondary
school level. It did so by way of the forum doctrine. In so doing, the
court gave great deference to the whims of reasonableness conjured up
by local school officials.
A second disturbing element of Bishop is its apparent endorsement
of viewpoint discrimination in what it found to be a nonpublic forum.
Viewpoint discrimination of protected speech by public officials is never
permissible, no matter the forum label.' 62 Dr. Bishop always preceded
his in-class religious remarks with the clear caveat that they were his
personal bias, his perspective. 6 ' As such, some of these remarks were
likely within the legitimate scope of his course of instruction."" There
is no real evidence of any coercion by Dr. Bishop, nor does it appear he
ever proselytized to his students."' He made it clear that his "optional
class" was not mandatory, " and it was no doubt known by his stu-
dents that he used a "blind" grading system.16 7 Moreover, "undisputed
affidavits" of other professors indicated that the university did not have
a policy which prohibited faculty members from interjecting their per-
sonal, nonreligious views into their classroom discussions. 68 In light of
these facts, the argument can be made that the university's restriction
was a viewpoint discrimination against Dr. Bishop and as such was not
permissible, even under the more deferential standard of review.
A third troubling aspect of Bishop stems from its sanction of view-
point discrimination. The court's reasoning apparently allows faculty
members to interject secular personal views into their classroom discus-
sions. It apparently does not allow for the interjection of religious per-
160. 926 F.2d at 1076-77.
161. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. "We need not now decided whether the
same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at
the college and university level." 484 U.S. at 273-74 n.7.
162. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (even reasonable regulations on speech in a nonpublic forum
may not be an effort to suppress expression because public officials oppose the speaker's view). See
also supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
163. 926 F.2d at 1068.
164. Id. Dr. Bishop taught exercise physiology, a subject in which varying theories of
human tolerance, design, and origin are likely to arise within the academic context. id.
165. See id. at 1068-69.





sonal views, even when such comments would not rise to a violation of
the Establishment Clause. Such viewpoint discrimination could be seen,
in itself, as a violation of the Establishment Clause by manifesting a
governmental hostility toward religious speech.
Under its analysis, the Bishop court appears to favor secular view-
point speech over religious viewpoint speech. The court explicitly stated
that its holding was based on a public forum free speech analysis, not
on an analysis under the religion clauses. 169 However, implicit in the
court's justification for allowing the restriction on Dr. Bishop's com-
ments was its apparent concern that Dr. Bishop's religious views might
offend the Establishment Clause. Such a justification virtually equates
neutrality with secularism. Governmental neutrality towards religion,
as required by the Establishment Clause, does not equate to a govern-
mental enforcement of secularism. 17 0 In permitting only secular, non-
religious personal views to be expressed by professors in the classroom,
the Bishop court has overstepped neutrality by fostering a governmen-
tal hostility toward religious speech. This, in itself, violates the Estab-
lishment Clause.
The final, and most disturbing, aspect of the Bishop decision is the
court's expressed avoidance of the competing First Amendment issues
present in the case. By its use of the public forum doctrine to determine
a lower standard of review for the restrictions imposed upon Dr.
Bishop, the court purported to resolve this case on free speech grounds
alone. In so doing, the court avoided the exploration of a balancing
approach to resolve the difficult issue of a direct conflict between free
speech rights and Establishment Clause concerns. Suppose Dr. Bishop's
speech had been found to be protected to a greater degree by a strict
scrutiny standard. Further assume that the university had been able to
show that Bishop's conduct amounted to an establishment of religion
under the Lemon test, 171 thereby providing it with a compelling state
interest. Under such a scenario, the court would have found itself
struggling to reconcile a "constitutional conflict of the highest or-
169. Id. at 1072.
170. Neutrality implies a governmental ambivalence toward religion, neither an advance-
ment nor an inhibition of religion. Secularism implies that the government should adopt a position
which is, in itself, the antithesis of any theological doctrine. See Michael W. McConnell, Neutral-
ity Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 146, 161 (1986); Laycock, supra note 89, at 6-
14; Wallace, Comment, supra note 89, at 365-67.




der. '17 2 There is no Supreme Court precedent for resolution of this
issue.173
Realistically, under the facts of Bishop,17 4 it is difficult to imagine
how his conduct violated the Establishment Clause. It is therefore diffi-
cult to justify a restriction on Bishop's speech simply because it was
religious in nature. Under the court's reasoning, however, if the speech
to be scrutinized is religious speech, it can be restricted in a limited
public forum without regard to its actual encroachment upon the
prohibitions of the Establishment Clause.
By failing to even attempt to balance the competing First Amend-
ment issues presented in this case, the court has cast a disturbing light
on the intellectual freedoms of the university classroom. If religious
speech may be restricted on campus without a true analysis as to its
constitutional infirmity, then the deferential standard adopted here
could also apply to restrict (or require) certain political, philosophical,
or scientific ideas. There is, and always should be, little tolerance for
such orthodoxy in the "marketplace of ideas."
D. Grant Carwile
172. Bender, 741 F.2d at 557.
173. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370 (1990).
174. 926 F.2d at 1067-70.
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